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91-6382.ZS
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1993-11-06
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NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
SAWYER v. WHITLEY, WARDEN
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the fifth circuit
No. 91-6382. Argued February 25, 1992-Decided June 22, 1992
A Louisiana jury convicted petitioner Sawyer and sentenced him to
death for a murder in which the victim was beaten, scalded with
boiling water, and set afire. His conviction and sentence were upheld
on appeal, and his petitions for state postconviction relief, as well as
his first petition for federal habeas relief, were denied. In a second
federal habeas petition, the District Court barred as abusive or
successive Sawyer's claims, inter alia, that the police failed to pro-
duce exculpatory evidence-evidence challenging a prosecution
witness' credibility and a child witness' statements that Sawyer had
tried to prevent an accomplice from setting fire to the victim-in
violation of his due process rights under Brady v. Maryland,
373 U.S. 83; and that his trial counsel's failure to introduce mental
health records as mitigating evidence in his trial's sentencing phase
constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. The Court of Appeals af-
firmed, holding that Sawyer had not shown cause for failure to raise
his claims in his earlier petition, and that it could not otherwise
reach the claims' merits because he had not shown that he was
``actually innocent'' of the death penalty under Louisiana law.
Held:
1.To show ``actual innocence'' one must show by clear and convinc-
ing evidence that but for a constitutional error, no reasonable juror
would have found the petitioner eligible for the death penalty under
the applicable state law. Pp.4-13.
(a)Generally, a habeas petitioner must show cause and prejudice
before a court will reach the merits of a successive, abusive, or
defaulted claim. Even if he cannot meet this standard, a court may
hear the merits of such claims if failure to hear them would result
in a miscarriage of justice. See, e. g., Kuhlman v. Wilson, 477 U.S.
436. The miscarriage of justice exception applies where a petitioner
is ``actually innocent'' of the crime of which he was convicted or the
penalty which was imposed. While it is not easy to define what is
meant by ``actually innocent'' of the death penalty, the exception is
very narrow and must be determined by relatively objective stan-
dards. Pp.4-7.
(b)In order to avoid arbitrary and capricious impositions of the
death sentence, States have adopted narrowing factors to limit the
class of offenders upon which the death penalty may be imposed, as
evidenced by Louisiana's definition of capital murder as something
more than intentional killing and its requirement that before a jury
may recommend death, it must determine that at least one of a list
of statutory aggravating factors exists. Once eligibility for the death
penalty is established, however, the emphasis shifts from narrowing
the class of eligible defendants by objective factors to individualized
consideration of a particular defendant by the introduction of mitigat-
ing evidence. Within this framework, the Court of Appeals applied
the proper standard to determine ``actual innocence'' when it required
Sawyer to base his showing that no reasonable juror would have
found him eligible for the death penalty under Louisiana law on the
elements of the crime itself and the existence of aggravating circum-
stances, but not the existence of additional mitigating evidence that
was not introduced as a result of a claimed constitutional error. This
standard hones in on the objective factors that must be shown to
exist before a defendant is eligible to have the death penalty imposed.
The adoption of stricter a definition, which would limit any showing
to the elements of the crime, is rejected, since, by stating in Smith
v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 537, that actual innocence could mean
innocent of the death penalty, this Court suggested a more expansive
meaning than simply innocence of the capital offense itself. Also
rejected is a more lenient definition, which would allow the showing
to extend beyond the elements of the crime and the aggravating
factors, to include mitigating evidence which bears, not on the
defendant's eligibility to receive the death penalty, but only on the
ultimate discretionary decision between that penalty and life impris-
onment. Including mitigating factors would make actual innocence
mean little more than what is already required to show prejudice for
purposes of securing habeas relief and would broaden the inquiry
beyond what is a narrow exception to the principle of finality.
Pp.8-13.
2.Sawyer has failed to show that he is actually innocent of the
death penalty to which he has been sentenced. The psychological
evidence allegedly kept from the jury does not relate to his guilt or
innocence of the crime or to the aggravating factors found by the
jury-that the murder was committed in the course of an aggravated
arson, and that it was especially cruel, atrocious, or heinous-which
made him eligible for the death penalty. Nor can it be said that had
this evidence been before the jury a reasonable juror would not have
found both of the aggravating factors. The evidence allegedly kept
from the jury due to an alleged Brady violation also fails to show
actual innocence. Latter-day impeachment evidence seldom, if ever,
makes a clear and convincing showing that no reasonable juror would
have believed the heart of the witness' account. While the statement
that Sawyer did not set fire to the victim goes to the jury's finding
of aggravated arson and, thus, to his guilt or innocence and the first
aggravating circumstance, it fails to show that no rational juror
would find both of the aggravating factors. The murder was especial-
ly cruel, atrocious, and heinous quite apart from the arson, and, even
crediting the hearsay statement, it cannot be said that no reasonable
juror would have found that he was guilty of the arson for his
participation under Louisiana law. Pp.13-16.
945 F.2d 812, affirmed.
Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which White,
Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, and Thomas, JJ., joined. Blackmun, J.,
filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Stevens, J., filed an
opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Blackmun and O'Con-
nor, JJ., joined.